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ne of the major problems of the eurozone 
is  the  divergence  of  the  competitive 
positions  that  have  built  up  since  the 
early  2000s.  This  divergence  has  led  to  major 
imbalances in the eurozone where the countries 
that  have  seen  their  competitive  positions 
deteriorate  (mainly  the  so-called  ‘PIIGS’  – 
Portugal,  Ireland, Italy,  Greece  and  Spain)  have 
accumulated  large  current  account  deficits  and 
thus  external  indebtedness,  matched  by  current 
account  surpluses  of  the  countries  that  have 
improved  their  competitive  positions  (mainly 
Germany). 
There is now a large consensus that in order to 
correct these imbalances it will be necessary for 
the  PIIGS  to  engineer  an  ‘internal  devaluation’, 
i.e.  to  reduce  prices  and  wages  relative  to 
Germany and the other core countries. There is no 
doubt  that  such  an  ‘internal  devaluation’  is 
painful as it tends to reduce aggregate demand 
and domestic production. This in turn increases 
government budget deficits and deteriorates the 
fiscal  position  of  the  countries  concerned. 
Countries  forced  to  engineer  an  internal 
devaluation  risk  being  pushed  into  a  ‘bad 
equilibrium’.  
All  this  leads  to  a  lot  of  pessimism  about  the 
capacity of the PIIGS countries to get out of these 
bad equilibria. Many commentators now take it 
for  granted  that  the  PIIGS  countries  will  not 
easily  improve  their  competitive  positions  and 
that they will be stuck in their bad equilibria for 
years to come. Is this pessimism warranted?  
In  Figure  1,  I  show  the  evolution  of  the 
competitive  positions  of  the  PIIGS  countries 
(measured  by  their  relative  unit  labour  costs) 
since  1999.  Two  features  stand  out.  First,  from 
1999  until  2008-09,  one  observes  the  strong 
deterioration  of  these  countries’  competitive 
positions.  Second,  since  2008-09  quite  dramatic 
turnarounds  of  the  competitive  positions  have 
occurred in Ireland, Spain and Greece, and to a 
lesser extent in Portugal and Italy.  
We show the sizes of these internal devaluations 
that  have  occurred  in  the  PIIGS  countries since 
2008-09  in  Table  1.  We  compute  the  internal 
devaluations  by  the  difference  between  the 
competitiveness index at its peak (which in some 
countries occurs in 2008, in others in 2009) and 
the index in 2012. This difference is expressed as a 
percentage, and can be interpreted as an internal 
devaluation,  i.e.  it  measures  the  decline  in  the 
relative  unit  labour  costs  of  these  countries 
achieved  between  the  peak  year  and  the  year 
2012.  From  Table  1  we  observe  that  the  Irish 
internal devaluation of 23.5% is substantial. The 
internal devaluations of Greece and Spain (11.4% 
and 8.9%) are lower but significant. The internal 
devaluations of Portugal and Italy are much less 
impressive.  
The last column of Table 1 shows how much of 
the deterioration of the competitive positions of 
the  PIIGS  countries  accumulated  during  1999-
2008-09  has  been  eliminated  by  these  internal 
devaluations. In the case of Ireland and Greece, 
the  internal  devaluation  has  eliminated  about 
75% of the losses of competitiveness accumulated 
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during  1999-2008-09.  In  the  case  of  Spain  this 
percentage  is  51%  and  in  the  case  of  Portugal 
30%. The Italian internal devaluation stands out 
as being almost non-existent.  
A  note  of  caution  should  be  made  here.  The 
percentages in the last column of Table 1 assume 
that  in  1999  these  countries  had  the  right 
competitive position. To the extent that prior to 
1999  the  PIIGS  countries  had  already  lost 
competitiveness,  the  numbers  in  that  column 
underestimate the effort that still lies ahead.  
Figure 1 
 
Source: European Commission, Ameco. 
Table 1 Internal devaluation in PIIGS countries (since 
2008-09) 
   Devaluation   % Achieved 
   since peak 
Ireland  23,5  75% 
Greece  11,4  78% 
Spain  8,9  51% 
Portugal  3,2  30% 
Italy  0,6  4% 
Note: Calculations based on Figure 1. 
In order to check how robust the results are to the 
choice of base year, I took as an alternative the 
average  relative  unit  labour  cost  over  a  long 
period,  i.e.  1970-2010.  It  is more  likely  that  this 
average is closer to the equilibrium than the 1999 
number. I use that average as the base to compute 
the  evolution  of  the  relative  unit  labour  costs 
since 1999. The result is presented in Figure 2. We 
find that the broad movements are very similar as 
in Figure 1 (which is not surprising as we divide 
by just another constant). As a result we find that 
the internal devaluations that have occurred since 
2008-09 are broadly similar to the ones obtained 
from  Figure  1.  This  can  be  seen  by  comparing 
Tables 2 and 1. What is different though is that 
the  additional  internal  devaluation  necessary  to 
reach  the  equilibrium  now  looks  somewhat 
different.  Comparing  the  last  columns  of  these 
two tables we find that Ireland has over-adjusted 
in 2012, while Greece has only done half of the 
necessary  internal  devaluation  to  reach 
equilibrium. Portugal and Italy here also appear 
to  be  in  need  of  substantial  further  internal 
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Figure 2 
 
Source: European Commission, Ameco. 
Table 2. Internal devaluation in PIIGS countries (since 
2008-09) 
   Devaluation  % Achieved 
   since peak 
Ireland  21,1  121% 
Greece  12,6  48% 
Spain  9,0  48% 
Portugal  3,4  22% 
Italy  0,6  7% 
Note: Calculations based on Figure 2. 
Whichever base year one chooses, it remains true 
that the size of the internal devaluations achieved 
by a number of PIIGS countries (Ireland, Greece, 
and  Spain)  is  remarkable.  It  certainly  goes 
counter  to  the  widespread  view  that  these 
countries  are  incapable  of  producing  internal 
devaluations.  
It should be stressed, however, that these internal 
devaluations have come at a great cost in terms of 
lost  output  and  employment  in  the  PIIGS 
countries. As these internal devaluations are not 
yet completed (except possibly in Ireland), more 
losses  in  output  and  employment  are  to  be 
expected. 
It is now becoming increasingly accepted, at least 
outside  Germany,  that  internal  devaluations  in 
the  GIIPs  countries  are  less  costly  when  the 
surplus countries are willing to allow for internal 
revaluations. Is there evidence that such a process 
of internal revaluations is going on in the surplus 
countries? The answer is given in Figure 3 that 
presents the evolution of the relative unit labour 
costs in the core countries. We observe that since 
2008-09  there  is  very  little  movement  in  these 
relative unit labour costs in these countries. 
The  position  of  Germany  stands  out.  During 
1999-2007  Germany  engineered  a  significant 
internal  devaluation  that  contributed  to  its 
economic recovery and the build-up of external 
surpluses.  This  internal  devaluation  stopped  in 
2007-08.  Since  then,  no  significant  internal 
revaluation has taken place in Germany. We also 
observe  from  Figure  3  that  the  other  countries 
remain  close  to  the  long-run  equilibrium  (the 
average  over  1970-2010)  and  that  no  significant 
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Figure 3 
 
Source: European Commission, Ameco. 
From  the  preceding  analysis,  one  can  conclude 
that  the  burden  of  the  adjustments  to  the 
imbalances in the eurozone between the surplus 
and  the  deficit  countries  is  borne  almost 
exclusively  by  the  deficit  countries  in  the 
periphery.  Surely  some  symmetry  in  the 
adjustment mechanism would alleviate the pain 
in  the  deficit  countries.  The  surplus  countries, 
however, do not seem to be willing to make life 
easier for the deficit countries and to take their 
part  of  responsibilities  in  correcting  external 
imbalances.  
The asymmetry in the adjustment mechanism in 
the  eurozone  is  reminiscent  of  similar 
asymmetries in the fixed exchange rate regimes of 
the Bretton Woods and the European Monetary 
System. In both these exchange rate regimes the 
burden  of  adjustment  to  external  disequilibria 
was borne mostly by the deficit countries.  
The  asymmetry  of  the  fixed  exchange  rate 
regimes  arose  because  deficit  countries  at  some 
point  where  hit  by  balance  of  payments  crises 
that depleted their stock of international reserves. 
Empty  handed  they  had  to  turn  to  creditor 
nations that imposed their conditions, including 
an  adjustment  process  to  eliminate  the  deficits. 
Creditor nations ruled supremely.  
It was hoped that the European Monetary Union 
would change all that, but this appears to have 
been in vain. The adjustment process within the 
eurozone  seems  to  be  as  asymmetric  as  the 
adjustment  mechanisms  of  the  fixed  exchange 
rate  regimes.  Why  is  this?  The  answer  is  not 
because of balance of payments crises. There can 
be no balance of payments crises in the sense as 
those  that  occurred  in  fixed  exchange  rate 
systems  because  in  a  monetary  union  internal 
foreign  exchange  markets  have  disappeared. 
Another  mechanism  is  at  work  in  a  monetary 
union.  
This mechanism arises from the inherent fragility 
of  a  monetary  union  in  which  national 
governments issue debt in a currency over which 
they exert no control. When in such a system the 
fiscal position of a country deteriorates, e.g. due 
to  the  deflationary  effects  of  an  internal 
devaluation,  investors  may  be  gripped  by  fear 
leading to a collective movement of distrust. The 
ensuing bond sales lead to a liquidity squeeze in 
the country concerned. This ‘sudden stop’ in turn 
leads to a situation in which the government of 
the distressed country finds it impossible to fund 
its outstanding debt except at prohibitively high 
interest rates. It follows that in the absence of a 
lender of last resort, individual governments of a IN SEARCH OF SYMMETRY IN THE EUROZONE | 5 
 
monetary  union  can  be  driven  into  default  by 
financial market panics.  
In  order  to  avoid  default,  the  crisis-hit 
government  has  to  turn  hat  in  hand  to  the 
creditor  countries  that  like  their  fixed  exchange 
rate  predecessors  impose  tough  conditions.  As 
the  creditor  countries  profit  from  the  liquidity 
inflow from the distressed country and are awash 
with  liquidity,  no  pressure  is  exerted  on  these 
countries to do their part of the adjustment. The 
creditors countries reign supremely and impose 
their rule on the system.  
The  European  Commission  has  now  been 
invested  with  an  important  responsibility  in 
monitoring  and  correcting  macroeconomic 
imbalances  in  the  framework  of  the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). The 
key idea in the MIP is symmetry, i.e. imbalances 
between surplus and deficit countries should be 
treated  and  corrected  symmetrically.  As  our 
analysis  illustrates,  up  to  now  the  European 
Commission does not seem to be willing (or able) 
to impose symmetry in the adjustment process.1 It 
imposes a lot of pressure on the deficit countries 
but  fails  to  impose  a  similar  pressure  on  the 
surplus countries. The effect of this failure is that 
the eurozone is kept in a deflationary straitjacket.
                                                   
1 It is very revealing that the initial ‘scoreboard’ used by 
the European Commission had the same 4% trigger point 
for  the  current  account  imbalance,  whether  this  was  a 
surplus or a deficit. Mysteriously this was later changed 
into an asymmetric trigger: +6% for surplus countries and 
4% for deficit countries.  
All  this  does  not  bode  well  for  the  future 
enforcement of symmetry in the macroeconomic 
adjustments in the eurozone. The MIP is unlikely 
to  work  symmetrically  for  the  same  reason  the 
EMS did not. In the absence of a lender of last 
resort  in  the  eurozone,  deficit  countries  will 
remain  in  a  structurally  weak  position  vis-à-vis 
surplus  countries  each  time  market  sentiments 
turns against them. This will continue to make it 
easier  for  the  European  Commission  to  impose 
tougher adjustment conditions on the deficit than 
on  the  surplus  countries,  thereby  becoming  the 
agent  representing  the  interests  of  the  creditor 
countries. The tyranny of the creditor countries in 
the eurozone will not disappear quickly.  